

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3

18 April 1966

OCI No. 1195/66

Copy No.

41



INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

WEEKLY REPORT

PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY

FOR THE

SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

State Dept. review completed

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3

SECRET


GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

WARNING

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3



C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
1. Greece	1
2. Haiti	2
3. Panama	3
4. Cambodia	4
5. Pakistan	5

18 April 1966



Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

1. GREECE

The political unrest which followed the resignation of Prime Minister Papandreou last summer has resulted in Greece's most serious governmental crisis since the end of the guerrilla war in 1949. The Stephanopoulos government, even now engaged both in a serious internal struggle and in a fight with the government of Cyprus over control of Cyprus' military forces, lacks a power base to enable it to move ahead with any significant program.


Stephanopoulos is kept in power by an uneasy alliance of formerly hostile conservative and center factions. His attempts to "govern" are opposed not only by the Papandreou forces and the crypto-Communist United Democratic Left, but by members of his own government bent on forwarding their political careers without regard for the welfare of the country.

The talk of dictatorship which was prevalent in the early stages of the crisis has now abated somewhat. However, the government's weakness and the moral decline in the country's political life have created a tendency among many conservatives to favor the installation of an authoritarian government, a solution employed several times in modern Greek history.

Either the establishment of a dictatorship or a fragmentation of the center would bring back the polarization of the 1950s and would endanger the continued existence of the monarchy.

Despite the Greeks' talent for compromise, a ready solution still seems remote. Papandreou still has a strong popular following, but is grooming his son Andreas to replace him and may be convinced he cannot return to power himself. Andreas still faces the violent opposition of Greek conservatives who are convinced he is in league with the Communists.

All the parties in the dispute are sensitive to US interests in Greece and will watch US moves closely in the next few months. US coolness toward the present accommodation will arouse the conservatives and moves to underpin the Stephanopoulos government would arouse the wrath of the pro-Papandreou and extreme left factions.



18 April 1966

SECRET

25X1

2. HAITI

Dissension and disaffection within the regime are at a higher level than at any time in the recent past. President Duvalier is confronted by graft and corruption among members of his personal entourage, a virtual standstill in economic activity and growing distrust between the Haitian military and the dread secret police.

Rumors of an imminent plot against Duvalier began circulating in Port-au-Prince early in April, coincidental with the reported execution of several officers and enlisted men of the Presidential Guard and an undisclosed number of "Ton Ton Macoutes," Duvalier's personal thugs. The severity of Duvalier's reprisals suggests that he feared a coup and moved quickly to nip it. Duvalier may have had in mind the fate of former Nigerian president Azikiwe and Ghana's Nkrumah whose deposals are reliably reported to have upset him.

25X1

Carlet Auguste, Haitian ambassador to the United Nations, recently sought out a US Mission officer to say that conditions in his homeland are so bad that barring some action by Washington "catastrophe is inevitable." Significantly, Auguste proposed that President Johnson dispatch a personal emissary to Duvalier, who he suggested is the only person capable of leading Haiti out of its plight. Duvalier could well have prompted Auguste's intercession in hope of benefiting from such special attention.

25X1

18 April 1966


25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3

3. PANAMA


President Robles and some of his principal advisers apparently are beginning to accept that the canal treaty negotiations cannot be completed this summer. The Panamanians are having difficulties with many features in the US proposals, especially those dealing with canal talks, jurisdiction, and the sensitive issue of US military bases.




Foreign Minister Eleta is favorably impressed with the US-Spanish base rights arrangement which utilizes a joint command system. The Panamanian counterdraft will probably include many adaptations of the US-Spanish agreement--including the flying of a Panamanian flag and designating a Panamanian "commandante" on US bases, and the use of joint military boards to resolve minor disputes between US troops and Panamanians.

President Robles is certain that opposition elements, especially Arnulfo Arias and extreme leftists, will make the base rights agreement a focal point of their campaign to prevent ratification of any canal compact.

[redacted] the Communist Party is stepping up activities against the treaty among peasants, labor and youth groups and in the volatile tenement districts bordering the Canal Zone. The negotiations could be set back at any time by a trivial, inflammatory incident.



18 April 1966



Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3

25X1

4. CAMBODIA

The Communists are apparently beginning to depend heavily on the use of Cambodian territory to support the war in South Vietnam. They are now getting significant amounts of rice from Cambodia and have built a road linking northern Cambodia to the Laotian infiltration net, apparently to move this rice into their supply channels more quickly. Viet Cong military forces are also using Cambodian territory as sanctuary with greater frequency.

These developments are a consequence of increasingly effective US military operations in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong are being forced from their border base areas into Cambodia, blocked from much of the rice harvest, and thus deprived of essential food.

The increased Communist dependency on Cambodia comes at a time when Sihanouk is more concerned than ever that the war will spill over into his territory. His problem is to handle the increasing Communist demands, which he is largely powerless to parry, without provoking military retaliation from Saigon. In an effort to cut the risks, Sihanouk has taken steps recently to increase contacts with the free world.

Nevertheless, it remains a fact that Sihanouk will do all that he can to ingratiate himself with the Communists--short of selling out Cambodia's vital interests--as long as he still believes the Communists will ultimately win in Indochina. This belief probably lay behind his granting of limited diplomatic standing to the North Vietnamese commercial mission in Phnom Penh.

25X1

25X1

18 April 1966

-4-

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3

5. PAKISTAN

Pakistani relations with Communist China continue to improve as exemplified by the impressive receptions accorded Liu Shao-chi during his recent state visits to West and East Pakistan. Pakistan has accepted some Chinese military aid, but its leaders stress their desire to remain allied with the US and to continue to receive US economic and--hopefully--military aid.

The Kashmir issue remains the touchstone by which Pakistanis judge whether other nations are for or against them. Pakistani-US relations have been especially strained since the termination of US military aid last autumn, but China has been riding on the crest of unprecedented popularity, primarily due to the gestures of support it gave Pakistan during the conflict with India.

The Pakistanis, still expressing a genuine fear of India and resolved to force some concessions on Kashmir, are determined to obtain military equipment from any possible source, including China, even though they are aware of US sensitivity on the China issue. Pakistan has already received tanks, antiaircraft weapons, small arms, and possibly MIG-19s from China, but it is also seeking military equipment in the Middle East and Western Europe. It continues to press for US equipment, on a purchase basis if not in grants, [redacted]

[redacted] The Pakistanis point out that India continues to receive large-scale military aid from the Soviet Union.

The Pakistani Government has encouraged popular enthusiasm for China, more successfully in West Pakistan than in the east wing where there is pressure for a normalization of relations with India. Nevertheless, President Ayub is maintaining links with the West through CENTO and SEATO and recognizes that the West is an irreplaceable source of vital economic assistance. This attempt at a balanced stance was exemplified by a refusal to include attacks on US Vietnam policy in the Ayub-Liu communiqué, and by Ayub's apparent attempts to convince Liu that the US was not pursuing an aggressive policy toward Peking. [redacted]

18 April 1966

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3

SECRET

SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010015-3
SECRET